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ABSTRACT 
 
Centralized Wage Determination and Regional 
Unemployment Differences: The Case of Italy 
 
This paper addresses the problem of the dualism of the Italian economy, particularly of its 
labor market. Although the Italian labor market is considered to be the most highly regulated 
among OECD countries, the unemployment rate in the North, which represents two thirds of 
the whole economy, is one of the lowest in Europe. In contrast, the South faces an 
unemployment rate between two to five times higher than the North. GDP per capita is also 
twice in the North than in the South, while nominal wages do not differ substantially across 
regions. Finally internal migration is the lowest among European countries since the middle 
seventies. This paper argues that the uniform wage is the result of the centralized wage 
setting carried on by unions, and that the absence of migration is the result of the proactive 
role of the government, which in the seventies stopped the mass internal migration from the 
South to the North and since then is acting to prevent the reappearance of such 
phenomenon. Uniform wage across regions, the active role of the government to prevent 
internal mass migration and a structural productivity divide between North and South are the 
institutional features that, within a general equilibrium matching model, explain the high 
unemployment rate in the South and, perhaps more interestingly, the low unemployment rate 
accompanied by low wages in the North even when compared to other western European 
countries. 
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 1 Introduction
Due to regulations imposed by unions and the government, Italy is reported by the OECD1
to have the highest degree of labor market rigidity, as measured by employment protection
legislation (EPL), among European countries. This is undoubtedly the results of having strong
unions with strong political and social power. However, compared to other western European
countries labor costs and wages in Italy are lower while unemployment is not higher than in
the rest of continental Europe.2 Moreover, by looking closer at the Italian economy and, in
particular, at its geographic di®erentiation, it can be noticed that across regions unemployment,
as well as productivity, is distributed unequally while wages and labor costs are much more
equally distributed. Most unemployment is concentrated in the South where the rate is up
to ¯ve times that of the rest of Italy and productivity is much lower. In contrast, in the last
thirty-¯ve years, the unemployment rate in the North has °uctuated from 4% to 7%, while
productivity reaches levels above the average of the largest western European countries. This
di®erentiation is in spite of the fact that labor regulations are the same throughout the country.
Another puzzling feature of the Italian economy is that, despite the huge di®erence in the
jobless rate and the challenges that the unemployed face, internal migration between the South
and North has been the lowest among developed countries for the last thirty years. This is
also in spite of the fact that Italy does not have strong barriers to geographic mobility.
The objective of this paper is to provide a model that reconciles the theory with these facts.
By means of calibration the model is then used to explain the large unemployment gap between
the North and the South of Italy, and at the same time the low wage productivity ratios paid to
northern workers compared to the average in the other western European countries. The model
is based on three main pillars. First of all, the centralized unions that set a wage, following a
right to manage bargaining model, which is uniform across all regions. Second, a productivity
divide that makes southern regions structurally less productive than the north. Finally, an
active role of the government that aims at preventing the mass migration phenomenon that
1See Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999).
2Most of the evidence presented in this paper is about the year 2000 for which it was possible to ¯nd all
the data. In 2000 unemployment in Italy was similar than in other continental European countries, however
later, due to the introduction of temporary contracts, unemployment went down signi¯cantly and in 2007 was
6.8 from a 10.6 in 2000.
2has characterized Italy until the mid seventies, by transferring resources from the north to the
south targeting especially unemployment. A key feature of the model is that unions \move"
¯rst with respect to the government in setting the wage rate. Therefore, they take into account
the tax rate that the government sets to collect the necessary resources to sustain unemployed
workers and prevent migration. Because the wage rate is the same across regions, ¯rms in the
lower productive regions will tend to employ less workers, inducing higher unemployment while
¯rms in higher productive regions will employ more workers and generate less unemployment.
Moreover, because unions care about the tax rate as well as the wage rate, they will avoid
setting a wage too high, which would generate too much unemployment in the lower productive
regions. This mechanism explains not only the large gap between the unemployment in the
more productive north and the less productive south, but, especially, the low unemployment in
the north as compared to other European countries with similar levels of productivity and labor
regulations together with the the lower wages. The centralized wage and the commitment of the
government to contain internal migration generates a political-economy equilibrium in which
the lower productive south mitigates the unions' power to set high wages. A counterfactual
experiments with decentralized unions shows this feature of the model. By allowing unions
to set wages at the local level, a much expected political reform in Italy, the model predicts
that wages would increase substantially in the north and decrease in the south, accordingly
unemployment would increase in the north at levels comparable to other European countries
and would decrease in the south to similar levels.
The dualism of the Italian economy is as old as Italy itself. The Southern part of the
Italian peninsula was notably poorer than the North before Italy was uni¯ed. Completed in
1871, the uni¯cation did not bring the wealth and prosperity that many expected to those
regions. However, this may not be completely true for Southerners. After uni¯cation the °ow
of immigrants from poorer regions to richer ones began, and many that chose to move were
able to establish better living conditions and greater opportunities in their new homes. Part
of a greater phenomenon that saw workers also leaving the South for other countries, this
migration continued until the 1920s, when it was temporarily stopped during the fascist era.
Migration began again after World War II and continued until the early 1970s, at which point
3internal migration in Italy dropped dramatically. The early 1970's was also the period in which
the Italian labor market was signi¯cantly reformed. Following the turbulent season of autunno
caldo3 several laws were passed that would change the labor conditions. Among these laws,
the most interesting for this paper are the law that abolished the so called gabbie salariali, a
system that allowed ¯rms to set di®erent wages for similar workers in di®erent regions (South
and North) and the law that reformed the social security system. The abolition of the gabbie
salariali progressively uniformed the salaries of Southern and Northern workers. The reform of
the social security system posed the basis for an increasing transfer of resources form the North
to the South. These reforms undoubtedly contributed to the end of the internal migration
between the two regions, migration that was increasingly seen as a negative phenomenon to
be contrasted by the political and social elites in Italy and especially by the communist party.
In fact, there were two main reasons because Italy was facing a growing opposition to internal
migration. On the one hand Northern workers were feeling an increasing competition from
Southern workers in terms of bargaining power and more generally in the fruition of public
services. On the other hand, Southern regions were concerned with the increased level of the
dependence ratio of their populations especially in rural areas.
Even though Italy went from being one of the most geographically mobile labor markets
to the most static among developed countries, the economic dualism that seemed to be the
driving force behind the mass migration for more than a hundred years persisted, and as of
today there are no signs of convergence. The persistence of these features for more than three
decades suggests that the economy found a long-run equilibrium in which a wide economic gap
and the absence of migration coexist at the expense of a wide unemployment gap.
Manacorda and Petrongolo (2005) claim that the most important feature for explaining the
labor market dualism of the Italian economy is the centralized wage-setting mechanism. They
support their view by an empirical analysis in which they show ¯rst, that in the thirty years
preceding 1998, wages steadily converged across regions in spite of an increasing unemployment
3Literally translated hot fall, autunno caldo refers to the fall of 1969 when the number of protests made
by salaried workers reached a level never reached before or after in the post war history of Italy. Unions
played a primary role in promoting and organizing these protests gaining signi¯cant political power. The
students' movement in 1968 and the more politically characterized workers' movement in 1969 also contributed
to changing the government policies toward the communist left. The Italian communist party (PCI) had its
maximum consensus in 1976 reaching a share of almost 35% of votes in the political general elections.
4gap, and, second, that wages seem to react more to market conditions in the North, rather
than country wide.
In their view, this asymmetry in wage setting is mostly responsible for increased unemploy-
ment in Italy, which is uniquely driven by increased unemployment in the South. Manacorda
and Petrongolo recognize that such an imbalance in the Italian labor market should generate
migration from the poor and jobless regions to the more attractive North. However, they notice
that there may be several reasons why this did not happen and actually stopped happening
in the past thirty-¯ve years. Among these are a reduction in the nominal wage di®erential, an
increase in housing price di®erentials, an increase of tax progressiveness favoring the poorer
South, the decline of the manufacturing sector that most attracted Southern workers to the
North and increased government support to the Southern regions in the form of disability
pensions and public jobs.
In their analysis, Manacorda and Petrongolo choose to treat migration as exogenous and
assume that it does not exist. However, not including migration as an endogenous variable
eliminates the possibility of studying the impact that di®erent policies may have on internal
migration. What will be the e®ect if unions decide to break the uniform wage policy and
allow for di®erentiated wage rates across countries? What will it happen if the government
stops implementing a policy that subsidizes the poorer regions of the South using the resources
collected in the North?
These questions can only be answered by taking into account the possibility that they will
have an impact on the decision to move from one region to the other. Manacorda and Petron-
golo implicitly recognize this point when they o®er factors that are the obvious results of unions
and government policies as an explanation for the absence of migration: the convergence of
wages between North and South, public disability and old age pensions, public employment,
and a highly progressive tax system. These are all factors that somehow contribute to trans-
ferring resources from the rich North to the poor South.
Faini, Galli, Gennari and Rossi (1997) suggest a solution to the empirical puzzle that
shows the internal migration in Italy decreasing while unemployment di®erentials among Italian
regions increase. They emphasize two major causes: high mobility costs and the ine±ciencies
in the job matching process. The ine±ciencies in the job matching process stemmed from the
5government having a monopoly over job matching services. In the late 1990s the job matching
process was successfully liberalized. However, the expected improvement predicted by Faini et
al did not occur.
One main contribution of this paper compared to the previous literature, is to document the
government aversion toward internal mass migration that started to arise during the seventies,
years in which ultimately the internal migration ceased. Although this fact has been studied in
other ¯elds such as sociology and history, it has never been analyzed in the economics literature,
nor have been analyzed its important consequences. It is still not very easy to unveil the exact
mechanism that from the generic aversion toward migration generated the necessary °ows of
resources capable to e®ectively reduce to a stop the internal migration from the South to
the North. Most probably a deeper analysis of the reforms of the welfare system that were
implemented in the seventies would clarify some aspects of this mechanism, but this is beyond
the scope of this paper. Yet, as this paper documents, the °ows exist and are mainly directed
to families that more than others face the problem of unemployment. Another contribution of
the paper is to take into account the proactive policy of the government in preventing internal
migration, together with centralized wage setting and regional productivity di®erence in a
general equilibrium model.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I present several statistics that
document the Italian dualism focusing on the labor market. Section 3 presents a theoretical
which is calibrated to match the data. The results of the calibration are presented in Section
4. Section 5 evaluates of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts of the Italian Economy
Italy is one of the large western European countries together with Germany, France, the UK
and Spain. Compared with these countries in 2000 Italy had similar but lower GDP per capita
except for Spain, and even closer GDP per worker.4 At the same time, labor costs compared
to productivity are lower in Italy than in any other country. Table 1 shows GDP per capita,
4More recently in 2007 Spain surpassed Italy in terms of GDP per capita.
6in the ¯rst row, GDP per worker in second row and labor costs and direct pay for salaries and
wages in the Industrial sectors in third and fourth rows, as reported by the regional statistics
of Eurostat in non adjusted Euros. The ¯fth row of the table reports the ratio of the GDP
of each country on the Italian GDP, while the fourth row reports the ratios of labor costs,
while rows six and seven report the ratios of labor costs and direct pay on GDP per worker
respectively. Finally, row eight reports the unemployment rates in all countries.
Table 1: Labor Costs and Productivity in Selected European Countries in 2000
Italy France Germany Spain UK
GDP per Capita 20917 23726 25095 15653 26719
GDP Per Worker 56906 62334 56780 41177 56777
Total Labor Costs 32310 37579 45829 26496 44858
Direct Pay (Wages) 20917 23726 25095 15653 26719
Ratio GDPxW/GDP Italy 1 1.0954 0.9978 0.7236 0.9977
Ratio Lab.Cost/Prod. 0.5678 0.6029 0.8071 0.6435 0.7901
Ratio Direct Pay/Prod. 0.3676 0.3806 0.442 0.3801 0.4706
Unemployment Rate 10.6 10.2 7.9 13.9 5.6
Data: Regional Statistics, Eurostat.
The GDP per worker was only 9% higher in France than in Italy, basically the same in
Germany and the UK while in Spain was almost 30% lower. That is to say that the Italian
productivity is not very far from other European countries. Yet, if we look at row six we see
that the Italian overall direct labor costs in the Industry is about 57% of GDP per worker,
while in France is 60%, 65% in Spain and about 80% in Germany and the UK. Similarly, direct
pay is in Italy about 37% or GDP per worker, while is 38% in France and Spain and over 44%
in Germany and the UK. In spite of similar productivity and lower labor costs Italy does not
necessarily enjoy a lower unemployment rate. The last row shows unemployment rates in all
countries and show that Italy performs very similarly to other countries.5
In spite of strong unions and strong and tight labor regulations, Table 1 clearly shows that
labor costs in Italy are lower than in other European countries compared to labor productivity.
However, if we look closer at the Italian economy, and in particular at its regional divide, a
more interesting picture appears. Table 2 reports the same data reported in Table 1 but for
5It should be noticed, however, that between 200o and 2006 the unemployment rate in Italy decreased
signi¯cantly to reach about 7%. This change was due mainly to the introduction of new more °exible term
contracts.
7¯ve Italian regions for which Eurostat provides data. The ¯ve regions are representative of
the divide between the North and the South of Italy. Those are Lombardia, one of the richest
Northern regions, Emilia-Romagna another Northern region, Lazio, the only central region,
which is also quite particular because it contains Rome, the capital of Italy. Then there are
Campania, Sicilia and Sardinia all representative of the Southern economy.
Table 2: Labor Costs and Productivity in Selected Italian Regions in 2000
Italy Lomb. Emil.-R. Lazio Camp. Sicilia Sard.
GDP per Capita 20917 27807 26884 24238 13010 13256 15564
GDP Per Worker 56906 64936 61124 65270 47463 49024 49451
Total Labor Costs 32310 34494 33450 38743 29149 35620 31217
Direct Pay (Wages) 20917 21567 20403 24894 18595 22915 19817
Ratio GDPxW/GDP Italy 1 1.1411 1.0741 1.147 0.8341 0.8615 0.8690
Ratio Lab.Cost/Prod. 0.5678 0.5312 0.5472 0.5936 0.6141 0.7266 0.6313
Ratio Direct Pay/Prod. 0.3676 0.3321 0.3338 0.3814 0.3918 0.4674 0.4007
Unemployment Rate 10.6 4.4 4 11 23.7 24 20.6
Data: Regional Statistics, Eurostat.
First thing to notice from Table 2 is the great di®erence in terms of GDP per capita between
the North, for example Lombardy, and the South, for example Campania. In Lombardy the
GDP per capita is more than double that in Campania and is about 33% higher than the
Italian average. In contrast, in Campania, the region of Naples, is only 62% of the Italian
average, while in Sicily is 63%. In Sardinia arrives to a 74%, though Sardinia is a much smaller
region and less representative of the Italian South. Part of the di®erence can be explained by
the uneven distribution of labor participation and unemployment. In fact, when we look at
GDP per capita these di®erences are somewhat reduced. Lombardy results having a GDP per
worker 14% higher than the Italian average while Campania 17% lower. In any case there is
still a gap of at least 20-30% between southern and northern regions. Looking at labor costs
and compensations in rows three and four we can notice that they do not di®er so much from
region to region. This explains the results in rows six and seven where we can observe that
the ratio of labor costs and compensations on productivity is quite di®erent between northern
regions and southern regions. Looking at row six we can see that labor costs absorb about
53-55% of the product per worker in the North, 59% in Lazio, while in the south the share goes
up from the 61% of Campania to the 73% of Sicily. Similarly, labor compensations are 33% in
8the north, 38% in Lazio and between 39% and 47% in the south. Another interesting feature
of the Italian divide is the net di®erence in the unemployment rates between north and south.
Unemployment a®ects only 4% of the labor force in Emilia-Romagna and 4.4% in Lombardy,
while more than 20% of the labor force in the three southern regions is unemployed.
Finally, it is also instructive to look at both the above tables together and compare espe-
cially the northern Italy with other European countries. Lombardy, for example has a GDP per
worker that is higher than the average of all other European counrtries, while Emilia-Romagna
is second only to Germany. Yet, labor costs and compensations are the lowest among all but
Spain. In the following sections I will focus more on the Italian divided economy and in par-
ticular on the composition of its labor force. The few stylized facts presented will be also used
in the calibration exercise at the end of the paper.
2.1 Dualism of the Labor Force
Here and in the reminder of the paper I use a mix of micro and macro data to describe some
important features of the Italian labor markets. The source for micro data is the Survey on
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), conducted by the Bank of Italy. I use the year cross
section in year 2000 of the longitudinal survey which comprises about 8,000 households (24,000
individuals), distributed over about 300 Italian municipalities. While the survey is longitudinal
in principle, it presents a high degree of attrition and half of the sample is rotated in each wave,
making it very di±cult to exploit the longitudinal feature to conduct disaggregated analysis.
SHIW is the only micro data available for Italy that contains detailed information about
occupations, education and earnings of individuals together with other personal characteristics
such as age, place of birth and place of residency. Other micro data exist for Italy that record
information about labor force status, such as the survey on the labor force done by ISTAT,
the national institute for statistics, but they do not contain any information about earnings
of individuals. The macro, or aggregated data, I use come mostly from Istat and are based
on several surveys or administrative data. I here use the aggregated ¯gures that the institute
publishes. I also use aggregated data from CRENOS, an institute on regional statistics based at
the University of Sassari and from SVIMEZ, the institute for the development of the Southern
economy. However, both these institutes re-elaborate data originally collected by ISTAT or
9administrative data from several ministries or other local governments' o±ces.
Tables 3 and 4 show the rates of employment and unemployment for men and women
together and for men only in the South and the North of Italy. These tables are obtained from
micro data from the SHIW. The population of reference is all the residents of age between 15
and 65 included. The SHIW asks respondents to indicate if they work, and if they do not work
to specify why. In particular respondents are also asked if they are actively looking for a job
for the ¯rst time or if they are actively looking for a job after having lost one (what is de¯ned
unemployed). Where actively looking for a job here it means to have make some serious e®ort
in order to ¯nd a job in the last four weeks preceding the interview. Moreover, the survey
also asks to the jobless interviewed that is not actively looking for a job if she was looking and
stopped because it was to hard to ¯nd one. These people are the discouraged unemployed,
and, particularly in the South and among women are a large fraction of the jobless people.
Italy has always been considered a country with a signi¯cant problem of joblessness. However,
Tables 3 and 4 show that the problem is in fact only in the South. The South experiences an
unemployment rate of more than 21%, while the North enjoys a very low rate of about 4%.
Table 3: Labor Force Statistics (1) - Men and Women
Employment/Unemployment Rates North South
Unemployment Rate (1) 4.10 21.28
Unemployment Rate (2) 4.37 23.75
Participation Rate (1) 61.88 52.24
Participation Rate (2) 62.06 53.94
Employment Rate 60.06 41.60
(1) First job seekers and unemployed searching for a job.
(2)First job seekers and unemployed not searching because
discouraged + (1).
Data source: Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW), Bank of Italy 2000. For a description of the data
see Brandolini (1999)
Moreover, looking at the participation rates it can be observed that in the South the fraction
of the working age population that is working or trying to ¯nd a job is 10 percentage points
less than in the North. This results in only 40% of working age Southerners having a job as
opposed to the 60% of Northerners6.
6The national average of about 53%, which is substantially lower than the European average, is therefore
10Table 4 shows that the di®erence in labor market participation between the two regions is
exclusively due to women. Solely looking at men around 70% of the working age population
intend to work in both regions, but again in the South only 58% work, while the others are
unemployed.
Table 4: Labor Force Statistics (2) - Men
Employment/Unemployment Rates North South
Unemployment Rate (1) 3.32 19.44
Unemployment Rate (2) 3.53 21.80
Participation Rate (1) 72.07 70.31
Participation Rate (2) 72.23 72.45
Employment Rate 71.47 58.04
(1) and (2) de¯ned as in Table 3.
Data source: SHIW, Bank of Italy 2000.
Table 5 shows the exit rates from employment and unemployment. As reported in the
last two rows these °ows imply durations of employment of approximately 21 and 13 years
for North and South, respectively, and 1:75 and 2:3 years, respectively, of unemployment.
Therefore, higher rates of unemployment in the South are caused by a greater di±culty of
¯nding a job and a higher probability of losing a job.
Table 5: Labor Force Statistics (3) Men and Women
Change of Status, Annual rate North South
Employment to Unemployment 0.96 2.10
Exit from Employment 4.63 7.78
Unemployment to Employment 29.19 15.05
Exit from Unemployment 57.25 43.61
Out of the Labor Force to Employment 6.42 5.04
Out of the Labor Force to Unemployment 2.73 6.72
Implied Average Duration of Empl. (years) 21.60 12.85
Implied Average Duration of Unempl.(years) 1.75 2.29
Status recorded in 2000 and 2001.
Data source: National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Labor Force
Statistics 2001.
Another important fact to connect with Tables 3 and 4 is the virtual absence of internal
migration in Italy. Faini (1999) documents this fact for recent years. Figure 1 shows the °ows
mainly due to the South.
11of people between the South and the North of Italy, as well as from and to other countries.
The ¯gure shows that the rates referring to all people are very low.
Figure 1: Population Flows
South 
20,910,587 
North 
36,702,028 
Abroad
61,350 (0.17%)
119,543 (0.57%)
129,977
25,236 (0.06%) 22,328 (0.11%)
36,112
Data Source: ISTAT 1997.
The Italian North and the South do not di®er only in terms of employment and unemploy-
ment, but also productivity is quite unevenly distributed. The following subsection presents
the productivity divide.
2.2 Productivity Di®erences
Figure 2 and Figure D1 show GDP and capital per working unit7. These ¯gures indicate that
between 1970 and 1995 the productivity in the South has always been lower than in the North.
As Figure D1 suggests this lower productivity of Southern labor is not induced by a lower
7The measure of working unit is obtained dividing the total amount of hours worked by all workers by the
typical working time, i.e. 40 hours per week.
12amount of capital per unit. Indeed capital per unit in these 25 years has always been a bit
higher in the South than in the North.
Figure 2: GDP per Working Unit - S/N Ratio
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
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Data Source: Center for North South Economic Research (CRENOS). Regional Accounts.
This is a peculiar fact. Given that productivity was lower in the South, why has there been
so much investment, such that per capita units of capital are higher than in the North? Figure
D2 shows capital per working unit in each sector of the economy. This picture seems to rule out
the obvious explanation, that the government is the major investor in the South in°ating the
amount of capital per working unit. However during the seventies and eighties the government
owned large companies in all sectors of the economy. For example prior to becoming part
of FIAT, Alfa Romeo and Lancia were under total control of the government which made
large investments in the South speci¯cally to help develop the regional economy8. Alfa Romeo
was sold to FIAT in 1987. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, many other publicly owned
companies were sold to the private sector starting what has been termed the privatization era.
8In the 1980's Alfa Sud was created, a line of Alfa Romeo cars produced in the Southern factories.
13It is not surprising then that capital per working unit is higher in the South during the period
before the privatization. Moreover, starting from the late 1980's capital per working unit in
the industrial sector starts to decline in the South relative to the North.
Unfortunately data are not available for capital per working unit after 1995. However Figure
D3 shows that the productivity of Southern regions did not substantially improve relative to
the North.
2.3 The Role of the Unions and the Government
Two main assumptions will be introduced in the model economy about the behavior of unions
and the government which need to be justi¯ed. I will assume that unions have a monopoly
power to set the wage rate and that the same wage rate is paid to all workers across regions and
I will assume that the government sets unemployment bene¯ts and taxes with the objective
to balance the budget and prevent souther workers to migrate to the North. Moreover I also
assume that in the strategic interaction between unions and the government, the unions "move
¯rst" with the knowledge of what the government will do depending on the conditions of the
economy. In other words, the unions see taxes and unemployment bene¯ts as functions of the
wage they set. In this section I motivate these assumptions.
2.3.1 Wage Regional Equalization
Much like other European countries, Italy is characterized by an important presence of unions
in the economy. Table 6 shows, for di®erent countries, two measures of union strength. The
¯rst number indicates how many employed workers are unionized (members of unions); the
second how many workers are actually covered by union contracts. The ¯rst number for Italy
is not exceptionally large if compared with other countries. However the second number shows
the true strength of Italian unions: 82% of Italian employees are covered by wages contracted
by unions.
There are three major trade unions9 in Italy that represent the greater majority of union
members10. These unions have various levels at which decisions are made from the council of
9These three major unions are the Italian General Confederation of Workers (CGIL), the Italian Confeder-
ation of Labor Unions (CISL) and the Italian Union of Workers (UIL).
10More recently in a few sectors of the economy like the public sector, speci¯cally school teachers, and in
14Table 6: Unionization in di®erent Countries
Country Union Density Union Coverage
France 9.0 95.0
Finland 81.0 95.0
Belgium 53.0 90.0
Germany 30.0 92.0
Italy 38.0 82.0
Netherland 25.5 81.0
Norway 58.0 74.0
UK 36.0 47.0
Canada 38.0 36.0
United States 16.0 18.0
Table from LaVoce, www.lavoce.it. Data from
OECD,1999 - Ebbinghaus e Visser 2000.
the factory, where workers have the ¯rst nucleus of organization, to the \confederate" national
council. By law there are three levels of bargaining between unions and Con¯ndustria (the
owners organization). The ¯rst level is national and confederate, i.e. at the \top" level of the
unions, the second level is national by sector and the third is local by sector. Wages are ¯rst
set taking into account the status of the economy11, at this stage a °oor for wages is set. The
second stage re°ects the di®erences between sectors of the economy, while the third between
¯rms within a sector.
It is only at the ¯nal stage of bargaining that a little di®erentiation of wages between
Northern and Southern workers can be introduced. However, typically at this stage the margin
for bargaining is very much reduced by the other two levels12.
To see if the unions are e®ective in equalizing wage rates across regions within each occu-
pation I look at the wages earned by blue collars and o±ce workers in di®erent sectors of the
economy. I use the data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) done by
the Bank of Italy from 1991 to 2006. In this time span the data were collected in the year 1991,
1993, 1995, 1998 and every two years thereafter until 2006, the latest year available. In total I
keep the information coming from surveys conducted in eight di®erent years. I use these data
transportation, many workers organized themselves in di®erent unions feeling that the three major ones were
not representing their interests su±ciently.
11The ¯rst level is the most political. At this stage usually the government intervenes not only as a counterpart
to the unions paying the salaries of public employees, but also as a moderator between unions and owners
organizations.
12See Checchi (2000) for more on Italian unions.
15as repeated cross sections adjusting the monetary variable such that they are all expressed in
year 2000 euros. I do this by de°ating each year using the consumer price index series reported
by the OECD statistics. The sample used is composed of men and women between 18 to 65
years old, working full time and full year as employees. Also, I consider only blue collars and
o±ce workers to keep the number of observations within each occupation reasonably large.
The survey reports only yearly earnings, therefore hourly wages were constructed using the
number of hours worked per week. Since the sample only contains full time full year workers
to obtain the hourly wages the yearly earnings are divided by hours per week times 52 weeks
worked in the year. Except for the information on the status of the employee (blue collar or
o±ce worker) and for the sector of activity the survey does not provide any other information
to identify the occupation of workers. Therefore, occupation here is de¯ned as the interaction
between these two variables. So, for example, a blue collar working in manufacturing works in
one occupation, a o±ce worker working in the same sector works in another occupation and a
blue collar working in real estate another.
Since productivity in the south is lower than in the north one would expect to see southern
workers paid less than northerners. That, at least, in the absence of unions interested in
equalizing wage rates. If however, unions are e®ective in equalizing the wage rates then this
di®erence will not appear. In Table 7 the log hourly wages are regressed on a set of dummies
representing each occupation (excluding agriculture), and a another set of dummies for south.
The south dummies are the product of a dummy that take value 1 if the observation is for a
southern worker and zero otherwise, and each occupation except for the south dummy relative
to the intercept which takes value of one for all southern workers. The regression includes also
dummies for education, so as to decrease the degree of heterogeneity within each occupation,
and a quadratic function of actual experience. Actual experience is obtained by subtracting
from age the age at the time of ¯rst job. In practice, having actual experience rather than
potential experience, age minus schooling years, or age serves to control for the fact that
southern workers start working at a later age. All these variable are also interacted to a south
dummy to look at possible di®erences in returns to investments in human capital between the
south and the rest of Italy. Moreover, dummies for each survey year except for 2000 were
introduced although not reported in the table.
16Looking at the results for men from the table is possible to see that the south dummy
is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for all the occupations except for those relative to the
trade sector. Blue collars in trade earn about 5% less if they work in the south, while o±ce
workers in trade earn almost 9% less in the south. For all the other occupations, and in
particular manufacturing which is the most important in terms of the number of employees,
the earnings of southerners are statistically not di®erent from the earnings of northerners.
Moreover, generally the coe±cient associated to the south dummy is very low and sometimes
is even positive, which is further evidence that unions are indeed e®ective at equalizing the
wage rates.
It is also interesting to see that the returns to education in terms of the wage rate are not
di®erent in the south and the north, all the south dummies associated to the levels of education
are in fact small and not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Also the returns to experience do
not di®er substantially between the north and the south, although here the coe±cient on the
south dummy shows a signi¯cant negative 0.43%. In other words, while each additional year
of experience increases the earnings of a northern worker by about 2.5%, for a southern worker
the increment is only 2%. One reason that could justify this di®erence could be the fact that
southerners are more likely to experience unemployment spells during the working life. As
such, the measure of experience adopted here over estimates the actual experience of southern
workers more than the experience of northern workers.
For women the picture looks very similar. One notable di®erence is that o±ce workers in
manufacturing earn about 11% less if they are in the south than if they are in the north, and
the di®erence is signi¯cant. The di®erence in trade is also stronger than for men southern
workers earning 14% less than northern workers.
Table 8 presents a set of tests on the joint signi¯cance of the south dummies. The ¯rst
row tests the null hypothesis that all the south dummies are not signi¯cant, hypothesis that is
rejected for men and women. The second row tests the joint signi¯cance of all the occupations
and excluded education and experience. The test is now rejected only for men at 5% con¯dence
level, but not at 1% and is not rejected for women at any conventional level of con¯dence.
Finally, the last row tests the joint signi¯cance of the south dummies for all the occupations
except for the occupations in the trad sector, and is not rejected for both sexes.
17Table 7: Log Nominal Wages by Sector
Dependent Var.: Log Hourly Wage Men Women
coe®. std. err. coe®. std. err.
Intercept All 1.3486 0.0198 1.3206 0.0281
South 0.0042 0.0275 -0.0312 0.0476
Blue Collars
Manufacturing
All 0.0808 0.0167 0.0236 0.0251
South 0.0014 0.0241 -0.0418 0.0461
Construction
All 0.0469 0.0180 0.0537 0.0609
South -0.0134 0.0254 -0.0095 0.1097
Trade
All 0.0310 0.0182 0.0164 0.0259
South -0.0530 0.0285 -0.0678 0.0488
Transportation
All 0.1382 0.0197 0.0375 0.0458
South -0.0005 0.0299 0.4083 0.2323
Real Estate
All 0.0739 0.0291 0.0023 0.0489
South 0.0551 0.0671 -0.0205 0.0934
Domestic Services
All 0.0243 0.0239 -0.0229 0.0288
South -0.0017 0.0397 -0.0381 0.0564
Public Sector Services
All 0.1612 0.0181 0.1146 0.0261
South 0.0297 0.0269 0.0070 0.0456
O±ce Workers
Agriculture
All 0.2179 0.0396 0.1162 0.0429
South -0.0140 0.0763 -0.0486 0.0861
Manufacturing
All 0.2515 0.0180 0.1611 0.0259
South -0.0125 0.0288 -0.1086 0.0527
Construction
All 0.2151 0.0250 0.1249 0.0354
South -0.0202 0.0423 -0.0476 0.0764
Trade
All 0.1775 0.0202 0.1456 0.0265
South -0.0871 0.0334 -0.1434 0.0499
Transportation
All 0.2955 0.0219 0.1721 0.0327
South -0.0520 0.0321 0.0347 0.0714
Real Estate
All 0.3436 0.0195 0.2055 0.0271
South -0.0235 0.0330 -0.0564 0.0524
Domestic Services
All 0.2468 0.0234 0.1652 0.0300
South 0.0026 0.0328 0.0404 0.0535
Public Sector Services
All 0.2754 0.0176 0.2701 0.0255
South 0.0078 0.0248 -0.0223 0.0450
Education
Lower Secondary
All 0.0592 0.0069 0.0552 0.0105
South 0.0082 0.0118 0.0018 0.0257
Vocational Secondary
All 0.1181 0.0086 0.1112 0.0123
South 0.0199 0.0162 0.0412 0.0307
Upper Secondary
All 0.1407 0.0090 0.1682 0.0129
South 0.0149 0.0151 0.0236 0.0289
University Degree
All 0.2655 0.0167 0.2911 0.0197
South 0.0285 0.0296 0.0229 0.0409
Experience
Years
All 0.0242 0.0007 0.0196 0.0009
South -0.0043 0.0013 0.0025 0.0023
Years2=100
All -0.0364 0.0016 -0.0304 0.0022
South 0.0059 0.0028 -0.0056 0.0060
R-squared 0.2978 0.2981
N. Obs. 23116 11932
18Table 8: F-Tests on South Dummies Restrictions
Men Women
Restrictions (variables set to zero) F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
All South Dummies 9.3021 0.0000 2.8507 0.0000
All Southern Occupations 1.8238 0.0136 1.0611 0.3844
Selected Southern Occupations¤ 0.9720 0.4893 0.3407 0.9956
2.3.2 Public Transfers
There is evidence that the function of the government in Italy has been to transfer resources
from the richer Northern regions to the poorer Southern regions. Table 9 presents this evidence.
It can be noted that the central government spends more per capita in the South than in the
North of Italy. Local regional governments are more responsive to the local conditions of the
economy because of their (very little) autonomy in collecting resources and deciding the level
of expenditure, so that the North spends more per capita than the South. Overall the total
public expenditure per capita is higher in the North than in the South. However, two things
are clear from the table: 1) the central governments is transferring resources from the North
to the South; 2) total public expenditure in the South represents a much larger proportion of
GDP than in the North.
Table 9: GDP and Public Expenditure per capita: year 2000
North* South
GDP 23,850.3 13,584.2
Central government 992.9 1255.8
Regions 2,442.2 2,017.6
Total 3,435.1 3,273.4
*The de¯nition of North excludes Lazio.
Source: SVIMEZ (2001), Table 23.
In Italy there is not a well established policy that provides unemployment bene¯ts to
jobless workers. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the transfers from the central
governments to the Southern regions have the indirect e®ect of ¯nancing unemployment spells.
In fact there may be several ways in which resources from the general Southern population
are diverted tounemployed workers. Perhaps the most important is intra-family redistribution.
Unemployed workers in Italy, and particularly in the South, are mainly young and living with
19parents. In this case, families often bear the cost of having a jobless member. These families are
often the target of general social programs that can improve their ability to care for its members.
Table 10 presents some evidence consistent with this explanation. Using data from the SHIW
I look at how the labor force status of an individual determines the probability that the family
of the individual receives transfers from some level of the government (Central, Regions, Cities
or other government agencies such as the national health system). The dependent variable in
the estimated probit model in the table is a dummy variable that takes value equal to one
if the family of the individual receives transfers for any reason and zero if it does not. One
of the reasons to receive transfers is also being unemployed and receive some form of direct
assistance. However, as mentioned before, this form of assistance is, at least formally, minimal.
In fact, only about 2% of the unemployed in the survey declare to receive unemployment
compensation. The explanatory variables are four dummies for four di®erent cases of labor
force status all alternative to being actively working (the intercept). I also add age and age
squared, where age is the actual age minus 25, so that the probabilities and the marginal e®ects
can be read as for a 25 year old. The table clearly shows that being unemployed signi¯cantly
increases the probability of the family receiving transfers from the government. Although
the causal relationship to infer from the table is not obvious, it is clear that those families
with unemployed members can count on the government for more support than others. The
probability that an average person who works receives transfers is about 4.40% for men and
5.69% for women, as can be seen from the coe±cient on the intercept.13 This probability is
about 8% higher for men and 6% for women if the person is unemployed. The only other factors
that increase the probability to receive transfers are being on welfare, and being a student.
These two characteristics are the most obvious to justify the intervention of the government
with transfers, nevertheless, transfers are even more probable to go to unemployed persons.
To address the complexity of the mechanism that guaranties that transfers will sustain the
unemployment spells of unemployed workers, as the table above suggests, is beyond the scope
of this paper. It is however important to know that, despite the absence of formal policies of
unemployment bene¯ts, unemployed can count on the generosity of government in a way or
another. Most probably through the mediation of families as well. In the following sections,
13P(x · ¡1:7065) = 0:440 assuming x » N(0;1).
20Table 10: Probability of Government Transfers
Dep. Var. gov. Transfers Men Women
Variable Probit Coe® Av. Marg. E®. Probit Coe® Av. Marg. E®.
Intercept -1.7065 -1.5811
(0.0308) (0.0326)
Unemployed 0.6514 0.0810 0.4380 0.0601
(0.0396) (0.0315) (0.0469) (0.0155)
Home Makers -0.0462 -0.0057 0.0653 0.0090
(0.4644) (0.0022) (0.0319) (0.0023)
Retirees -0.2710 -0.0337 -0.1600 -0.0219
(0.0632) (0.0131) (0.0713) (0.0056)
In Welfare 0.2674 0.0332 0.1139 0.0156
(0.0941) (0.0130) (0.0848) (0.0040)
Student 0.5345 0.0664 0.4544 0.0623
(0.0563) (0.0259) (0.0576) (0.0160)
Age 0.0093 0.0012 0.0154 0.0021
(0.0035) (0.0004) (0.0034) (0.0005)
Age2/100 -0.0164 -0.0020 -0.0503 -0.0069
(0.0103) (0.0008) (0.0097) (0.0018)
Average Probability 0.0663 0.0735
(0.0364) (0.0256)
LogLikelihood -4879 -5509
N. Obs. 20780 21354
I model, as a necessary simpli¯cation, I model these transfers as unemployment contingent
income paid to unemployed workers.
2.3.3 The Role of the Government in Preventing Migration
So far I produced some evidence that unions e®ectively equalize the wage rate across di®erent
regions and I have shown that the government transfers resources from the north to the south
actively targeting unemployed workers among other individuals in need of assistance. In this
section I argue that the policies put forward by the government have also the intention to pre-
vent southern workers from migrating to the north. To understand this point it is necessary
to gain a little bit of a historical perspective of the Italian internal and international migra-
tion experience along with how it was perceived by politicians and other intellectual elites in
di®erent periods. Rella and Vadala (1984) o®er an interesting review of the sociological and
political literature on Migration in Italy in the post war period until the early eighties. The
21authors claim that the political and intellectual elites in Italy have generally had a favorable
view of outmigration as a safety valve, capable of preventing an outburst of social tensions,
especially in the economically less developed areas of the country, in particular in southern
Italy. In the sixties however, the view of outmigration from the south started to change. Much
of the favor for outmigration was based on the assumption that it would help boosting the
southern economy. However, by the mid sixties there were rasing concerns that this was not
happening and that much of the emigration was actually impoverishing the south by reducing
one of the few resources it had in abundance, labor. Particularly among Marxist intellectuals
and politicians the exodus, as it was by then called the mass emigration from the south, was
perceived as a result of the imperialistic exploitation of the developing regions by the more
developed ones.14 By the early seventies the southern emigration was seen by the left parties
as the e®ect and at the same time one of the causes of the underdevelopment of the south. All
the proposed solutions to the problem of the southern underdevelopment questione meridionale
contemplated the end of the emigration. Meanwhile also in the north there was an increasing
concern that the mass migration from the south was generating problems of social integration
and of \congestion" in the areas where they were concentrating. Once again the communists
were the ¯rst ones to react to these increasing concerns.15
In 1972, the head of the communist party in Turin, the city with the highest concentration
of southern immigrants, \for the ¯rst time posed the issue of stopping the exodus of southern
workers and their families from the south to the north" at the XII PCI congress in Turin.16
The communists in the north were particularly worried that the population growth in cities like
Turin was threatening the social cohesion by putting under pressure all the social services such
as schools, hospitals, public transportation and the infrastructure of the cities, that clearly
were not adapting to the fast growth of their demand.17
14See for example Cinanni (1974). Cinanni was also an important southern politician member of the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) and contributing in forming the view of the communist party toward internal migration.
15The high pressure of southern immigrant workers on the manufacturing sector of the industrialized cities
of the north started to represent a problem for the northern workers and the unions especially when in the mid
seventies the industrial production started to slow down. Unions were concerned that the pressure from the
south was limiting their bargaining power, a concern that was also shared by the communist party being the
one mainly supported by these workers.
16I report in appendix C an original letter from A. Minucci, who was in 1972 at the head of the PCI in Turin.
17That the social cohesion was a serious problem is also proved by the fact that in the late seventies a series
of political movements started to appear that were against the policy of inclusion of southern immigrants in
22While the left parties, and in particular the communist party, did not have any direct role
in the government of Italy, it is undoubtable that they had a strong impact in determining the
economic and social policies of the government in general and of other local public administra-
tion in particular. An illustrative example of this in°uence is given by the policy suggested and
then implemented by the head of the PCI in Turin. As illustrated in the letter in Appendix, the
PCI suggested to decentralize the production of FIAT in southern regions to prevent potential
southern emigrants from emigrating and let them ¯nding jobs in the south. Few years after
this was suggested few factories were established in several areas of the south with incentives
set by the government. Moreover, the Christian Democratic party (DC), a party historically
rooted in the southern regions, also saw an opportunity to strengthen its power in the south
by increasing the amount of transfers °owing to these regions.
In conclusion, while it is not easy to see one single law, decreet or policy implemented
by the Italian government, it is clear that the political climate in the seventies turned against
internal migration. This lead to an increased attention to the problem of the underdevelopment
of the south and created the conditions for stronger welfare program that aimed at stopping
the exodus of workers from the south. By the mid seventies this result was accomplished and
internal migration was nearly zeroed.
3 The Model
There are two distinct labor markets geographically determined, characterized by di®erent
productivity values. Unemployed workers can decide to leave the market in which they are
originally located and search in the other market. They can move at any time while unem-
ployed, but they pay a cost cm if they relocate. Firms open vacancies whenever they want
to ¯ll a job. Keeping a vacancy open implies some cost pic, proportional to productivity pi
speci¯c to markets.
the north. Some of these movements were openly racist against southern workers(terroni). In 1979 one of
such movement ¯nally formed a political party, the Lega Lombarda which later began the Northern League.
The Northern League also started its political activity representing the growing concerns and open eversion
of northern workers against southerners. Later, when the migration from the south stopped, and southerners
were not a \threat" to the north any more, the Northern League characterized its political activity by strongly
opposing immigration from other countries.
23The rate at which unemployed workers and open vacancies meet is regulated by a meeting
function m(v;u) that depends on the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in each
market at the time. Once there is a meeting ¯rms observe the worker speci¯c productivity
shock ®, and decide if the candidate is suitable for the job, i.e. if ® is above the reservation
value. If so, a match is created and the wage w is paid to the worker. After a match is created
a worker is hit by productivity shocks that arrive at a rate ¸. The productivity shock changes
the worker speci¯c productivity ®. Firms ¯re workers whenever their productivity decreases
below the reservation value.
Finally, I assume that the wage is set by the unions and is the same for all workers regardless
of their market. Unions are assumed to represent all workers in the economy and weight all
workers equally. Decisions within unions are assumed to be taken by majority rule. Therefore,
the role of unions is to set the wage so as to maximize the expected utility of the median
worker in the economy. Moreover workers pay a tax collected by the government to ¯nance
unemployment bene¯ts paid to unemployed workers. The role of the government is to prevent
unemployed workers from migrating from the South to the North. The government does this
by setting unemployment bene¯ts at such a level that the value of unemployment in the lower
productivity region plus the cost of moving equals the value of unemployment in the higher
productivity region. Also it sets the tax rate in order to collect the taxes necessary to balance
the budget after paying the unemployment bene¯ts.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) the meeting function is written as follows
mi(vi;ui) = m(1;
ui
vi
)vi ´ qi(µi)vi where µi =
vi
ui
:
Given the meeting function the ratios at which vacancies are ¯lled can be de¯ned as follows
q
f
i = q(µi)
Z ¹ ®
Ri
dF(®); (1)
where ¹ ® is the upper limit of the shock distribution and Ri is the reservation value. The ratio
at which unemployed workers ¯nd a job is instead given by
qw
i = q(µi)µi
Z ¹ ®
Ri
dF(®): (2)
243.1 Value of a match to an employer
The value of a job to an employer depends on the productivity speci¯c to that match. The
productivity is the product of the shock ® and the market speci¯c productivity parameter pi.
Therefore the value of the job is
rJi(®) = pi® ¡ w + ¸
Z ¹ ®
Ri
[Ji(x) ¡ Ji(®)]dF(x) ¡ ¸F(Ri)Ji(®): (3)
That is, the expected discounted gain in the value of a match is given by the di®erence between
the productivity and wage paid by the employer, plus the expected change in value. Note that
here the wage is not a function of ® since it is determined by the unions and is the same for
all workers.
The above asset equation describes the value of a match that is created. Therefore it is
assumed that ® is greater that the reservation value Ri determined by the employer. However
in order to decide to open a vacancy a ¯rm must consider the expected value of a match before
the productivity shock is realized. Therefore, taking the expectation of equation (3)18
rJe
i = pi®e
i ¡ w ¡ ¸F(Ri)Je
i ; (4)
where the superscript e indicates the expectation conditional on ® being greater than Ri
®e
i =
Z ¹ ®
Ri
®dF(®): (5)
3.2 Value of a match to a worker
The value of a match to a worker is determined by the following asset equation
rWi = w(1 ¡ t) + ¸F(Ri)[Ui ¡ Wi]; (6)
where t is a proportional tax collected by the government in order to provide unemployment
bene¯ts.
18Derivation in Appendix A.
253.3 Value of a vacancy and of unemployment
The value of setting a vacancy to an employer is19
rVi = ¡pic + q
f
i [Je
i ¡ Vi]: (7)
While the value of being unemployed for a worker is
rUi = b + qw
i [Wi ¡ Ui]; (8)
where b represents unemployment contingent income. The value of a vacancy is therefore
equal to the probability of ¯nding a worker for a ¯rm, times the value of an initial job match
less the value of the vacancy itself, minus the cost of keeping a vacancy open. The rate
at which a worker is found is regulated by the meeting function and is proportional to the
portion of vacancies posted in the same location. The value of unemployment is given by the
unemployment bene¯ts the unemployed worker receives plus the expected gain of searching,
i.e. the expected value of a match discounted by the rate at which the worker matches with a
¯rm.
3.4 Wage Setting
In this section the major features of the model are introduced. As stated above it is assumed
that the wage is set by the unions following a right-to-manage model in which unions decide a
take it or leave it wage rate and ¯rms decide the level of their employment. The wage that is the
same for all workers in both regions. In other words the unions set a wage that is then imposed
by law on everybody. This wage setting is the common way wages are actually determined in
Italy where the three major unions meet with representatives of ¯rms and set a wage that is
imposed on every worker with the same tenure, skill level and sector of the economy. Another
important point to note is that unions do not set the wage only for unionized workers but for
everyone. Once the wage is set by unions it does not matter if a worker is unionized or not,
he is o®ered the contract wage.
19See Appendix A on how to derive this equation.
26As a simpli¯cation I assume that all workers are unionized and therefore the wage is set
by the median worker so as to maximize the value of his match. Therefore:
w = argmaxfWmg; (9)
where Wm is the value of a match to the median worker. In the model the median worker is
the one that works in the region with higher employment. This is because, given that the wage
is equal for everyone, the value of a match to a worker is the same for all employees within
one region, while across di®erent regions it can be di®erent because the probability of ¯nding
a job after being ¯red is di®erent.
3.5 Government
The government plays an important role in the model. The actions of the government are
subject to the constraint of balancing the budget through ¯xing taxes and unemployment
bene¯ts so as to avoid migration. Its program is then described by the following
Ui = Uj + cm (10)
b(°iui + °juj) = tw(°i(1 ¡ ui) + °j(1 ¡ uj)); (11)
where cm is a cost of moving faced by the unemployed worker from region j that would like
to migrate to region i, assuming that in region j the value of unemployment is lower than in
region i.
3.6 Solving the Model
In order to obtain the variables of interest as functions of the parameters of the model a few
stationary equilibrium conditions need to be imposed. First, the value of a vacancy in each
region is equal to zero, the so-called free entry condition which implies that the employers
open vacancies until there is an expected pro¯t. Creating new vacancies lowers the expected
pro¯t of employers by making the market tighter (increasing µ), this process continues until
the market is tight enough to insure expected pro¯ts are equal to zero for all the employers.
27An additional condition is the hiring/¯ring condition. This in turn gives the reservation
value of the idiosyncratic shock. Since the distribution of shocks does not change in each period,
the decision of hiring and ¯ring a worker made by the ¯rm is based on the same threshold
value. In other words the ¯rm wants to keep a worker as long as she has an idiosyncratic
productivity that is higher than the threshold value. This is true at the meeting when the
decision to hire is made, and thereafter when the decision of ¯ring may be made.
The ¯rst condition translates in the following equation
Je
i =
pic
q
f
i
: (12)
While the second condition can be expressed as follows
Ji(Ri) = 0: (13)
Substituting equation (4) and equation (3), respectively, in equation (12) and equation (13) it
is possible to obtain the values of market tightness and the reservation shock value as functions
of the wage: µi(w) and Ri(w).
Finally to obtain the wage I substitute µi(w) and Ri(w) into µ and Ri in equation (6),
where here i refers to the north. Then I maximize the value of a match to a Northern worker
in equation (6) with respect to w, taking the government problem as a constraint. Although in
principle the model should have closed form solutions, the maximization problem is too involved
for being solved analytically and numerical solutions must be used, hence an evaluation of the
properties of the model will be done by simulating alternative scenarios with the calibrated
parameters. The following section explains how the calibration is done.
4 Calibration
To test the quantitative implications of the model the ¯rst step is to choose the functional forms
for the meeting function and for the shock distribution. For simplicity I choose a Cobb-Douglas
functional form for the meeting function
28m(u;v) = u´v1¡´ ! q(µ) = µ¡´; (14)
and a uniform function for the shock distribution with mean ¯xed to 1, and variance s. As for
the values for the parameters, I ¯x the interest rate r to :01 as the model period is a quarter,
and the elasticity of the meeting function to :5 following Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and
Blanchard and Diamond (1990) who provide empirical evidence for the functional form and
the value of the elasticity for US data. I also normalize the value of productivity in the North
to 1. The population shares °i's are set to 0.68 for the North and 0.32 for the South. Moreover,
I need to choose values for the recruiting cost c, for the variance of shocks s, the arrival rate
of a shock after a match is created ¸ and the productivity in the South. These parameters are
found by calibrating the model to match appropriate data moments.
Table 11: Calibration (1) - Parameters
Parameter Normalized Fixed by Calib.
Structural Prod. North pN
p
Structural Prod. South pS
p
Shock arrival rate ¸
p
Variance shock distrib. s
p
Recruiting cost c
p
Population Shares °, and 1 ¡ °
p
Interest rate r
p
Duration elasticity ´
p
Cost of moving cm
p
Table 11 shows how the parameters of the model are chosen. The cost of moving is un-
observable and is a di±cult parameter to choose. I ¯x the parameter to 5 and perform a
sensitivity analysis to assess how sensitive the results are to this parameter. The parameters
that are set by calibration satisfy the moment conditions in Table 12. These moments are the
ratio of the Southern productivity to the Northern productivity in row 1, the durations of a
job spell in the North and in the South in rows 2 and 3 and the unemployment rate in the
North (row 4). The second column in Table 12 shows the functional forms derived from the
model, while the right column shows the data values of the moments.
Table 13 reports the values the parameters that satisfy the calibration conditions. The
29Table 12: Calibration (2) - Data Moments
Moment Description Moment Function Data Value
Ex=post Productivity Ratio S/N
pS(RS+1+
p
3s)
pN(RN+1+
p
3s) 0.8073
Employment Duration in the North (yrs.) 1
4¸F(RN) 21.6
Employment Duration in the South (yrs.) 1
4¸F(RS) 12.85
Unemployment Rate in the North (%)
¸F(RN)
qw
N+¸F(RN) 4.37
Table 13: Calibration (2) - Parameter Values
Parameter North South
Structural Prod. pi 1 0.771
Population Shares °, and 1 ¡ ° 0.68 0.32
Shock arrival rate ¸ 0.0694
Variance shock distrib. s 0.2259
Recruiting cost c 48.97
Interest rate r 0.01
Duration elasticity ´ 0.5
Cost of moving cm 5
structural productivity in the South is about 77% that of the North. The shock arrival rate
is set by the calibration to about 0.07, while the variance of the shock distribution is set to
0.226. Since the uniform distribution is centered at 1, this implies a value for the lower and
upper bounds of the distribution of 0.61 and 1.39, respectively. That is, individuals can expect
to have a productivity between these two values with equal probability. The recruiting cost is
48.97, which is a relatively high value if compared to the productivities.
Table 14 shows the result of the calibration. The moments that are not targeted are the
unemployment in the South and the unemployment durations in the South and the North.
Unemployment in the South is higher than in the data, reported to be 23.75. However, there is
evidence that unemployment could be higher than indicated by standard statistics especially
in the South. Standard statistics, following the International Labor Organization (ILO) de¯-
nition, identify unemployed an individual who is not working and actively searched for a job
in the one month prior to the interview. In Italy, and particularly in the South, the average
period of unemployment is over two years long; as such it may be reasonable to expect that
active searching actions may be more spaced in time than one month. Viviano (2002) provides
30some evidence that this is the case. Re-estimating the unemployment rate for the South using
6 months for the frequency for job searching rather than the 1 month used by ILO he ¯nds
that the unemployment rate in the South is 26.9% rather than 23.75%.
Table 14: Calibration (3) - Variables Values cm=5
Data Moments Model Predictions
Endogenous variables North South North South
Rate of Unemployment 4.37 23.75 4.37 26.92
Unemployment Duration (years) 1.75 2.29 0.99 4.73
Employment Duration (years) 21.6 12.85 21.6 12.85
Ex Post Productivity S/N ratio 0.8073 1.07 0.86
Wage w - 0.51
Taxes t - 0.07
Unemployment Bene¯ts b - 0.29
In terms of the duration of unemployment the model does not perform as well as it does
with respect to Southern unemployment. However, it should be noted that the set of data used
to derive these moments is di®erent from the data used for unemployment rates. Therefore,
there may be some discrepancies between the data.
Prior to looking at the other results from the calibration it is useful to give an interpretation
of the obtained parameter values. Returning to Table 13 it is striking that the recruiting cost is
very high compared to the productivity averages. The reason why this arises must be found in
the zero vacancy condition, that is, the value of a vacancy must be equal to zero in equilibrium.
Equation (7) implies that
pic = q
f
i Je
i : (15)
That is, the cost of setting a vacancy must be proportional to the expected value of a match
times the probability to form a match once the vacancy is set. Due to the prolonged duration
of employment spells, particularly in the North, and the large di®erence between the expected
productivity of a match and the wage, the value of a match to an employer is very high, hence
the high vacancy cost.
A high vacancy cost is an indication that the Italian labor market is a very rigid one. As
stated above, Italy is a country with very high Employment Protection Legislation. However,
31the model does not formalize these aspects of the Italian economy except for the wage setting
process. Other rigidities induced by law might be related to strict regulations about the labor
conditions of employees in their workplaces, the di±culty to start and end a business due to an
excessive bureaucracy, taxes imposed by the government for starting a business or for hiring
an employee etc...; all these rigidities are captured by the high cost of setting a vacancy. This
re°ects the reduced gain faced by the prospective employer due to the restrictions imposed
by laws on her behavior once the match is created. Firing restrictions are also present in the
Italian economy, however, they only exist for large companies that have at least 15 employees,
while they do not bind for smaller companies, which are a large part of the Italian economy, and
most importantly do not bind in the informal sector, which especially in the South represents
a large share of the economy.
The arrival rate of a shock is calibrated to 0.0694. This could also be considered low, which
is clearly related to the long employment spells. In other words, once the match is created,
the lower the arrival rate of shocks is the greater the probability that the match is not broken,
i.e. the worker is not ¯red.
The structural productivity in the South is set at 0.77, lower than the ex-post productiv-
ity. The ex-post productivity is the product of the structural productivity and the average
conditional productivity of the working population. Given that in the South the structural pro-
ductivity is lower than in the North, while the wage is the same, the reservation productivity
level in the South is higher than in the North (0.74 in the North and 0.83 in the South). This
implies that the workers average conditional productivity is higher than in the North; as such
the structural productivity must be lower than the ex-post productivity. This suggests that
workers in the South are actually more selected and therefore more productive individually
than in the North. However, because of the structural productivity they do not produce as
much as Northern workers.
Finally, the shock variance in the calibration determines the di®erence between the proba-
bilities to be employed or ¯red, and therefore, given the productivity di®erence, the unemploy-
ment rates and employment durations. Together with the shock arrival rate, this parameter
re°ects the low degree of uncertainty present in the Italian labor market once a job is created.
325 Model Evaluation
Since the parameter indicating the cost of moving cannot be identi¯ed by calibration I ¯xed
the value to 5 for the calibration and then performed sensitivity analysis in order to assess the
importance of the parameter.
Table 15: Sensitivity Analysis - cm= 0 to 10
cm=0 cm=10
Endogenous variables North South North South
Rate of Unemployment 4.28 26.13 4.46 27.73
Unemployment Duration (years) 0.97 4.57 1.00 4.90
Employment Duration (years) 21.77 12.92 21.43 12.76
Ex Post Productivity 1.06 0.85 1.07 0.86
Wage w 0.500 0.503
Taxes t 0.113 0.037
Unemployment Bene¯ts b 0.444 0.137
The sensitivity analysis presented in Table 15 suggests that unemployment rates are not very
sensitive to the cost of moving. Changing the cost of moving to zero and 10 changes the value
of unemployment bene¯ts needed to equalize the values of unemployment, and therefore the
taxes. However, it does not signi¯cantly change the employment and unemployment rates in
both regions.
If Southerners face a higher cost of moving then they need a lower compensation for their
unemployment in order to remain in their own regions, therefore the unemployment bene¯ts
are lower and so are taxes. If the cost is instead very low, then unemployment bene¯ts need
to be higher.
5.1 North to South Transfer of Resources
One of the important implications of the model is that the joint policies of the government
and unions determine a transfer of resources from the rich North to the poor South. When in
a uni¯ed country there are regions that are economically lagging behind it is natural that the
central government implements redistributive policies to improve the conditions of the poorer
regions. In Italy, a big part of this redistribution is at the same time the cause and e®ect of
the higher unemployment rate. Table 9, shows the per capita public expenditure done by the
33central government and by regional governments in the South and the North in comparison to
their GDP. The central government spends about 3% of that region's GDP in the North, while
the fraction in the South is about 10%. Considering total public expenditure those shares grow
to 14.35% in the North and 24.62% in the South. Given the proportion of the populations in
the two regions the ¯gures reported in the table imply that each Italian pays about 15.21% of
its share of produced GDP for providing public expenditure. Therefore, the Northern worker
¯nances the Southerner with 0.86% of produced GDP.
The model predicts similar transfers of resources from the Northern workers to the Southern
population. Fixing the cost of moving equal to 5, the model in Table 14 predicts that the North
transfers about 66% of the taxes paid to the Southern economy. In fact the share of the taxes
collected by the Northern economy that returns to Northern residents is given by
buN
wt(1 ¡ uN)
= :338: (16)
Therefore, the Northern worker collects about 2.43% of her income to transfer to the Southern
economy. Since the income of the Northern worker is about 47% of the total share of GDP per
worker produced in the North, the transfer of resources in terms of GDP is of 1.15%. This is
a similar ¯gure to the 0.86% from the data.
5.2 An Alternative Scenario: De-centralized Unions
In this section I describe a situation in which the cost of moving is assumed to be very high
such that unemployed workers are never willing to move from one region to the other and
unions set wages regionally. This exercise is designed to show that the government and union
policies of centralized wage setting and transfers from the North to the South can explain the
exceptionally low unemployment rate in the North.
Table 16 shows the unemployment rates in the North and the South under this di®erent
scenario. The government here simply sets the unemployment bene¯ts exogenously. These are
set at the same level obtained above by calibration. It is possible to notice that unemployment
in the North is 3 times higher than it was previously, while in the South the rate is lower.
Northern workers now enjoy a higher wage rate, though the taxes they pay now are only slightly
lower in terms of percentage and higher in absolute terms. In the South the unemployment
34rate is less than half what it was previously and is even lower than in the North, although
only marginally. The di®erence in structural productivity is now completely transferred to the
wage. The wage rate in the South is in fact about 77% of the wage in the North.
Table 16: Italy Divided
Endogenous variables North South
Rate of Unemployment 12.90 12.68
Unemployment Duration (years) 2.27 2.23
Employment Duration (years) 15.32 15.39
Ex Post Productivity 1.09 1.05
Wage w 0.593 0.456
Taxes t 0.071 0.091
Unemployment Bene¯ts b 0.029 0.029
In this scenario, unions do not need to take into account the reaction of the government
to the wage setting. Before unions were careful about setting a high wage because they knew
it would increase unemployment in the South, and, consequently, the tax rate to ¯nance the
transfers implemented by the government. With higher tax rates, the after-tax wage could
become lower. Keeping the wage rate low to avoid high unemployment rates in the South
makes employers willing to employ more workers and leads to the low unemployment rate. In
the scenario presented here unions are free to set the wage taking into consideration only the
economic situation in the North.
6 Conclusion
This paper documents the government aversion toward internal mass migration that started to
arise during the seventies, years in which ultimately the internal migration ceased. Although
this fact has been studied in other ¯elds such as sociology and history, it has never been
analyzed in the economics literature, nor have been analyzed its important consequences. It
also takes into account the proactive policy of the government in preventing internal migration.
A general equilibrium matching model is developed and calibrated to replicated the relevant
statistics that describe the main facts of the Italian labor markets. The model is used to explain
the large unemployment gap between the North and the South of Italy, and at the same time
the low wage productivity ratios paid to northern workers compared to the average in the other
35large western European countries. The model is based on three main pillars that determine
the long run equilibrium. First of all, the centralized unions that set a wage, following a
right to manage bargaining model, which is uniform across all regions. Second, a productivity
divide that makes southern regions structurally less productive than the north. Finally, an
active role of the government that aims at preventing the mass migration phenomenon that
has characterized Italy until the mid seventies, by transferring resources from the north to the
south targeting especially unemployment. A key feature of the model is that unions \move"
¯rst with respect to the government in setting the wage rate. Therefore, they take into account
the tax rate that the government sets to collect the necessary resources to sustain unemployed
workers and prevent migration. Because the wage rate is the same across regions, ¯rms in the
lower productive regions will tend to employ less workers, inducing higher unemployment while
¯rms in higher productive regions will employ more workers and generate less unemployment.
Moreover, because unions care about the tax rate as well as the wage rate, they will avoid
setting a wage that is to high generating too much unemployment in the lower productive
regions. This mechanism explains not only the large gap between the unemployment in the
more productive north and the less productive south, but, especially, the low unemployment in
the north as compared to other European countries with similar levels of productivity and labor
regulations together with the the lower wages. The centralized wage and the commitment of the
government to contain internal migration generates a political-economy equilibrium in which
the lower productive south mitigates the unions' power to set high wages. A counterfactual
experiments with decentralized unions shows this feature of the model. By allowing unions
to set wages at the local level, a much expected political reform in Italy, the model predicts
that wages would increase substantially in the north and decrease in the south, accordingly
unemployment would increase in the north at levels comparable to other European countries
and would decrease in the south at similar levels.
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38Appendix A More Derivations
This appendix shows how equation (4) can be derived. Notice that equation (3) can be written
as follows
rJi(®) = pi® ¡ w + ¸
Z ¹ ®
Ri
Ji(x)dF(x) ¡ ¸Ji(®): (17)
Also note that the integral on the right hand side represents already the conditional expectation
of the match to an employer that is indicated with Je. Therefore taking the conditional
expectation of the whole expression it is possible to write
Z ¹ ®
Ri
rJi(®)dF(®) =
Z ¹ ®
Ri
(pi® ¡ w)dF(®) +
Z ¹ ®
Ri
[¸
Z ¹ ®
Ri
Ji(x)dF(x)]dF(®) ¡
Z ¹ ®
Ri
¸Ji(®)dF(®): (18)
That is
rJe
i = pi
Z ¹ ®
Ri
®dF(®) ¡ w + ¸
Z ¹ ®
Ri
Ji(x)dF(x)
Z ¹ ®
Ri
dF(®) ¡ ¸Je; (19)
and since the second integral on the right hand side is fact Je, making use of equation (5) is
possible to write
rJe
i = pi®e ¡ w + ¸[1 ¡ F(Ri)]Je ¡ ¸Je; (20)
which gives equation (4).
To understand equation (7) it is possible to think about the problem in a di®erent way.
When the meeting between the employer and the unemployed worker takes place, they draw
from the F(®) distribution a number, but they know at this point only if it is greater or equal
than Ri or lower. Later they draw another value from the distribution that contains only
numbers greater than Ri if the ¯rst draw was greater, or lower if it was lower. They get Ri
again if they got Ri in the ¯rst place. Equation (7) can then be written as follows:
rVi = ¡pic + q(µi)[
Z ¹ ®
Ri
[
Z ¹ ®
Ri
Ji(x)dF(x) ¡ Vi]dF(®)]; (21)
39where the ¯rst part of the integral between the interval [a;Ri] is dropped because it is equal
to zero since Ji(®) equals zero for any value lower than Ri. Solving the double integral obtain
equation (7) is obtained.
Appendix B Solutions
To solve the model the ¯rst step is to ¯nd a solution for the reservation values of the shocks
as functions of the wage. First equation (3) is rewritten as follows
(¸ + r)Ji(®) = pi® ¡ w + ¸
Z ¹ ®
Ri
Ji(x)dF(x): (22)
Following Pissarides (2000) equation (22), for ® = Ri, becomes
(¸ + r)Ji(Ri) = piRi ¡ w + ¸
Z ¹ ®
Ri
Ji(x)dF(x): (23)
Subtracting equation (23) from equation (22), and noting that Ji(Ri) = 0 it is possible to
obtain
(¸ + r)Ji(®) = pi(® ¡ Ri): (24)
Now plugging equation (24) into equation (22) the following equation is obtained
Ri =
w
p
¡
¸
r + ¸
Z ¹ ®
Ri
(x ¡ Ri)dF(x); (25)
and knowing the distribution F(x) equation (25) can be solved obtaining Ri as function of w.
Once the Ri's are found, the next step is to obtain the µi's as a functions of w. To do so
¯rst a solution for the expected value of a match to an employer must be found. Given the
free entry conditionVi = 0, from equation (7) it is possible to write
Je
i =
pic
q
f
i
: (26)
Inserting equation (26) into equation (4) it is possible to obtain
40pic
q
f
i
=
pi®e
i ¡ w
r + ¸F(Ri)
; (27)
which can be solved for µ in terms of w, once the solution for Ri is plugged into it .
Once the Ri(w)'s and the µi(w)'s are found, these functions are plugged into the government
objective functions to obtain t(w) and b(w). Finally plugging the solutions as functions of w
into the value of a job to a worker in the North, the objective function of the unions is obtained.
Therefore, the solution for w is obtained by maximizing this objective function. Once w is
found, all of the other parameters are also found.
Appendix C Letter from A. Minucci former Secretary of the
Italian Communist Party of Turin.
Appendix C.1 Original in Italian
La necessit di arrestare l'esodo dei lavoratori meridionali e delle loro famiglie dal Sud verso
il Nord,e soprattutto verso l'area torinese, fu posta per la prima volta come una questione
sociale e politica fondamentale al XII congresso del Pci di Torino (febbraio 1972) nel rapporto
introduttivo del segretario della Federazione comunista Adalberto Minucci.
Nel decennio 1950-60 la Fiat aveva registrato una espansione rapida e incontrollata. La
popolazione di Torino era aumentata da 700 mila a 1 milione e trentamila abitanti. La con-
gestione dell'area torinese aveva raggiunto limiti intollerabili, e per la stessa azienda automo-
bilistica il vantaggio di una manodopera a basso prezzo si era trasformato in aumento di costi
e in contraddizioni insuperabili. Tutti i servizi sociali, dalla scuola ai trasporti, alle fognature
dei nuovi quartieri, versavano in una crisi sempre pi acuta .
La proposta dei comunisti di compiere una svolta radicale, spostando nelle regioni merid-
ionali gli investimenti per le nuove fabbriche di automobili e i relativi servizi, fu discussa in
varie riunioni riservate tra l'amministratore della Fiat Umberto Agnelli , il suo consigliere cul-
turale ( lo scrittore Paolo Volponi che divenne poi senatore del Pci) e lo stesso responsabile
del Pci torinese, Minucci. Le contraddizioni erano giunte a tal punto che i dirigenti della Fiat
¯nirono per accogliere le proposte del Pci a lungo respinte. Per la prima volta una vertenza
sindacale, apertasi in quel periodo, si pose il problema degli investimenti al Sud. Negli anni
41successivi sorsero le fabbriche automobilistiche di Mel¯, di Termini Imerese, le fabbriche di
macchine agricole in Puglia
Appendix C.2 Translation
The necessity to stop the exodus of Southern workers and their families from South to North,
especially to the Turin area, was posed for the ¯rst time as a fundamental social and political
issue at the XII congress of the PCI of Turin (February 1972) in its the introductory speech
by the secretary of the communist Federation Adalberto Minucci.
Between 1950 and 1960 Fiat saw a rapid and uncontrolled growth. The population of Turin
increased between 700,000 to one million and thirty thousand inhabitants. The congestion of
the Turin area reached intolerable levels, and even for the automobile company the gain in
terms of cheap labor vanished bringing higher costs and insuperable contradictions. All social
services, from school to transportation, sewage for new city areas, were in a very acute crisis.
The proposal of the communists to perform a radical change, re-directing the investments
for new factories of automobiles and the relative services to the southern regions of Italy, was
discussed in several meetings between the CEO of Fiat Umberto Agnelli, his cultural counselor
(Paolo Volponi, writer, who later became senator for PCI) and the secretary of PCI in Turin,
Minucci. The problems were at such a level that the head of Fiat end up accepting the proposals
of PCI which refused in the past. For the ¯rst time in a dispute opened in that period by the
unions, the problem of investing in the South was posed. In the following years factories of
automobiles in Mel¯, Termini Imerese were opened and factories of agriculture machinery in
Puglia were also opened.
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Figure D1: Capital per Working Unit - S/N Ratio
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
1.1
Year
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
S
/
N
)
Capital per working unit: Ratio South/North
Data Source: CRENOS.
43Figure D2: Productivity and Capital per Unit - S/N Ratio
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44Figure D3: Productivity - S/N Ratio
0.78
0.79
0.8
0.81
0.82
0.83
0.84
0.85
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
R
a
t
i
o
GDP
VA Manufacturing
Data Source: ISTAT.
45